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What are global and diffuse risks? How should we think about their potential 
to turn into threats that overwhelm societal resilience in areas of limited 
statehood, precipitating violent conflict and governance breakdown? This 
working paper explores these questions in two sequential steps. First, it 
shows that existing explanations at the onset of violent conflict and 
governance breakdown remain focused on local conditions and immediate 
“bad neighbourhood” effects, neglecting global and diffuse risks. In a highly 
interconnected and interdependent world such neglect represents a 
fundamental omission with substantial theoretical and policymaking costs. 
Global and diffuse risks must be conceptualized, evaluated, and 
systematically integrated into predictive models, preparedness-efforts, and 
resilience-building strategies. Secondly, it articulates and explores a five-
cluster typology of global and diffuse risks. It is only by taking global and 
diffuse risks seriously as explanatory variables at the onset of violent conflict 
and governance breakdown that the EU can make genuine progress in 
developing a long-term resilience-building strategy. 
INTRODUCTION 
Existing explanations of the onset of violent conflict and governance breakdown in 
areas of limited statehood (ALS) overwhelmingly focus on local conditions and 
immediate “bad neighbourhood” effects while excluding global and diffuse risks.  
This lacuna is partly derivative of a long legacy of “methodological nationalism” 
(Wimmer and Schiller 2002) that has tended to reify the state, treat domestic and 
international causes in binary terms, and relegate external factors to a residual 
category of influence (Lawson 2019). It is also an unintended consequence of a 
virtually hermetic disciplinary divide between those interested in the causes of civil 
war, revolution, and state fragility versus the more recent and fragmented interest in 
global and diffuse risks, with the latter emerging from disparate disciplines 
concerned with a wide variety of natural and anthropogenic risks. Indeed, the 
prediction of conflict onset and political instability remains a controversial topic in 
academic research, and no early-warning system has proved reliable for policy-
making. 
In a highly interconnected and interdependent world, this represents an omission 
with substantial theoretical and policymaking costs. It undermines our 
understanding of the causes of violent conflict and governance breakdowns, but it 
also hampers the ability of policymakers to evaluate the sources and limitations of 
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societal resilience, identify potential tipping points for future outbreaks of deadly 
conflict, and foster conditions of enhanced resilience in the EU neighbourhood.  
The prevailing exclusion of global and diffuse risks is best illustrated with reference 
to the three explanatory logics dominating the literature on civil war onset. Civil 
wars are by far the most common type of contemporary political violence in ALS and 
have been explained in terms of grievance, greed, and opportunity (Cederman and 
Vogt 2017). Dating back to the 1960s, grievance-based accounts view violence as a 
reaction to deep-seeded ethnic, political, or socioeconomic injustice. In contrast, 
explanations centred on greed adopt a microeconomic approach in which violent 
conflict and governance breakdowns occur, where the opportunity costs of fighting 
are low, and where rebels can maximize economic gain from lootable natural 
resources or rent seeking. According to the third and most influential explanatory 
logic of civil wars, insurgent violence is best explained by the opportunities opened 
for rebels to challenge state authority in weak states. All three explanations 
emphasize intra-societal processes and state-level institutional conditions.  
A similar state of affairs prevails in the state fragility field. Summarizing over a 
decade of research by the influential Political Instability Task Force, Goldstone 
(2008) identifies “five major pathways that comprise the most common processes 
leading to state-failure”. These are: (i) escalation of communal group (ethnic or 
religious) conflicts; (ii) state predation; (iii) regional or guerrilla rebellion; (iv) 
democratic collapse leading to a coup d’état or civil war; and (v) succession reform or 
crisis in an authoritarian state. The latest major studies on causes of acute political 
instability similarly identify exclusionary political regimes, uneven economic 
development, the local culture of opposition and protest, or a widening gap between 
formal (state) and informal (societal) institutions as the causes of governance 
breakdown and insurgent violence (Bosley 2017). Although some scholars have 
recognized that transnational dynamics play an important role, none have 
systematically mapped or integrated global and diffuse risks into their explanatory 
logics (Cederman and Vogt 2017). 
This gap has become jarring. The latest World Bank Strategy for Fragility, Conflict and 
Violence 2020-2025, observes that “Climate change, demographic change, migration, 
digital transformation, illicit financial flows, and violent extremism are often 
interconnected, with effects that transcend borders” (World Bank 2020). Similarly, EU 
defence ministers have tasked the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy with developing a “comprehensive, 360 degrees analysis of the full 
range of threats and challenges” facing the EU (Council of the European Union 2020). 
Yet analysts have expressed concerned over a “Christmas tree approach” to risk 
identification that is both disorganized and omits controversial issues (Koenig 2020). 
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With these needs and potential criticisms in mind, this Working Paper articulates a 
five-cluster typology of global and diffuse risks most likely to affect societal 
resilience in ALS surrounding the EU. The category of global and diffuse risks is, by 
definition, enormously extensive and varied, so both analysts and practitioners can 
easily be overwhelmed by its breadth and complexity. Its almost unfathomable 
complexity is further compounded by the historically unprecedented connectivity of 
the world (Farrell and Newman 2016; Khanna 2016) and the arguably growing 
inability of Europe to effectively isolate itself from its tumultuous neighbourhood 
(Kaplan 2018).  
Accordingly, we define the need for a comprehensive but parsimonious risk typology 
in section II below and then proceed to articulate a five-cluster risk typology in 
sections III through VII . Finally, a brief conclusion is presented in section VIII.  
GLOBAL RISKS AND DIFFUSE RISKS  
Although a universally agreed-upon definition for risk has been difficult to attain, 
the concept is essentially “a measure of the probability and severity of adverse 
effects” (Lowrance 1976: 4). It embodies the likelihood of harm, the expected severity 
of that harm and, implicitly at least, a temporal dimension that includes the 
immediacy and duration of harm to a given biological or social system. Put in more 
operational terms, we can think of risk scenarios as necessitating the application of 
four risk assessment questions: What can go wrong? What is the likelihood? What are 
the consequences? and What is the time frame? (Haimes 2009: 1651). Within this 
conceptual universe, we distinguish global and diffuse risks both from one another 
and from other categories of risks. We focus on these categories of risk to address the 
prevailing scholarly lacuna. Although  specifically applied to the EU neighbourhood 
in this case, the definitions and taxonomy herein would benefit risk assessments in 
any region of the world.  
For the purpose of this Working Paper, global risks are risks that originate or emanate 
from identifiable geographical locations outside a given state or region’s immediate 
neighbourhood. A supervolcanic eruption, of the type that occurred on Indonesia’s 
Mount Tambora in 1815—causing a global cooling of 1°C and crop failure as far away 
as the United States (Raible et al. 2016)—is a stark example of a global risk. In 
contrast, diffuse risks—such as climate change—are either not geographically 
contingent or non-territorial in nature, even though their impact on different 
localities is likely to vary. 
The distinction between global and diffuse risks may not always be clear-cut or 
immediately apparent. A cyber-attack on critical infrastructure may be launched by a 
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state, alliance, or non-state actors operating under the loose command and control of 
a state. Under this scenario, the attack would possess the identifiable geographical 
markers of a global risk. Yet such an attack may also emanate from hackers utilizing 
servers across the globe, in which case it would approximate a diffuse risk, at least in 
terms of a legal culpability challenge. Similarly, the sometime blurry line dividing 
institutionalized from diffuse “lone wolf” terrorism represents a grey-zone area, 
where the distinction between global and diffuse risks can be difficult to mark with 
clarity. 
Three framing caveats are pertinent to delineating the boundaries of global and 
diffuse risks for our purposes:  
First, given the need to highlight the role of global and diffuse risks, we do not 
reiterate those causes of violent conflict and governance breakdown that are already 
well established in the literature.  
Second, global and diffuse risks are not synonymous with existential risks, meaning 
risks that threaten the destruction of humanity’s long-term potential through either 
extinction or unrecoverable civilizational collapse. Existential risks—such as an 
asteroid collision or stellar explosion—would extinguish all human civilization, 
regardless of varying levels of societal resilience or state-capacity and are, therefore, 
analytically redundant in considering risks that “merely” tip ALS into governance 
breakdown and violent conflict.  
Lastly, in mapping applicable global and diffuse risks, we are, as a rule, temporally 
bounded to a short to medium-term time horizon of three to seven years. That said, 
where applicable, we identify risks that require longer-term monitoring and 
preparedness efforts. 
We articulate a five-cluster typology of global and diffuse risks most likely to affect 
societal resilience in ALS surrounding the EU.1 The typology is summarized in Figure 
1 below: 
                                               
1
  Earlier work adopted six clusters of risk, with the sixth cluster being “Technology-Driven Disruption”. 
However, we have omitted the sixth cluster here since its impact is generally certain to occur onside 
the relevant time-frame. Readers interested in the full exploration of the six risk clusters are referred 
to Magen et al. (2019).  
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Figure 1: A five-risk cluster typology 
Cluster 1: Geopolitical rivalry and risks of major conflict 
Cluster 2: Unconventional security risks (hybrid warfare, terrorism, WMD, cyber) 
Cluster 3: Environmental (including uncontrolled urbanization and diseases) 
Cluster 4: Demography and uncontrolled migration 
Cluster 5: Global financial and economic risks 
While mindful that processes of conflict onset and governance breakdowns display 
great complexity, we offer a risk typology meant to balance comprehensiveness with 
complexity-reducing parsimony. In this, we follow the science of systems modelling, 
which recognizes a continuous process of trade-offs between complexity and 
accuracy (Haimes 2009). Accordingly, our typology is as simple as possible and as 
complex as needed. 
1. GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRY AND RISKS OF MAJOR ARMED 
CONFLICT 
This section deals with order contestation and the risk of a major armed conflict that 
includes one or more of the major global contenders. In the current contestation 
atmosphere, such conflict has the potential to change the international order’s 
current balance. Three trends increase this risk: (1) Russia and China’s advancement 
of an alternative international order and increased assertiveness in pursuing such an 
order’s interests and broadening its sphere of influence (2) The steadily increasing 
level of cooperation between Russia and China to counter liberal ideologies and 
Western policies, and (3) the continued military dominance of the US and its 
reluctance to cede its hegemonic role to any geopolitical competitor.   
Global order contestation is a major risk with a meaningful potential to influence 
ALS. As with many issues of global order, the US is a profound factor that has been  
shifting away from its traditional trajectory in the past decade. The Obama and 
Trump administrations recognized that the US’ “returns” on its investment of the 
global order have increasingly diminished. President Obama relied more on 
international agreement and cooperation than his predecessors in the last decades, 
whereas President Trump seemed to barely rely on international agreement and 
cooperation. Although seemingly pulling the US in different directions in terms of 
the global international order, both movements are altogether different from the 
traditional international order in the aftermath of WWII (Cooley and Nexon 2020). 
Similarly, other distinct contenders for global order such as Russia and China are 
pushing for an incremental change in the international order through a 
confrontational approach. 
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Although an elusive and oversimplified term, this section refers to the international 
liberal order as the set of positive outcomes that has marked international affairs 
since 1945. Among these are the global economy, the responsiveness of states to their 
citizens, joint action regarding transnational issues, tolerance, individual wellbeing, 
human rights, and a decrease of great-power wars (Bobbitt 2018). In a broad sense, it 
refers to norms, rules, and institutions that govern international politics, which is 
strongly tied to international power. The liberal international order was born in 
many ways at the end of WWII (with roots in WWI Wilsonian ideas), and the UN 
system was its first layer. It was then followed by the addition of Western and 
Eastern blocks during the Cold War. Over time, decolonization also resulted in new 
states and new interlacing layers. The collapse of the Bretton Woods system further 
changed its economic and political landscape, and eventually, the collapse of the 
USSR reinforced the idea that liberalism could not apply to only a subset of countries 
but to all of them (Bobbitt 2018; Friedman Lissner and Rapp-Hooper 2018). 
As Expected, this order contestation unfolds in physical and non-physical domains 
across the globe. The highest risks for a major armed conflict exist in Russia and 
China’s backyard where friction with the West exists. Attention and continuous risk 
assessment capacities should be devoted to the South China Sea, the Sino-Indo 
border, Eastern European and Baltic countries that border with Russia, the Horn of 
Africa, and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The relevant criteria for 
observation should include the contenders’ interests in the area, the structural 
characteristics of the country or region, military-related developments, and the 
country’s resilience (Gavin 2018; Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2019: 
4). 
Although Russia, and especially China, participate in and enjoy the fruits of the 
liberal international order, they are not satisfied with their role in it, which they 
perceive to ultimately undermines their core interests. Using a wide range of tools, 
they attempt to weaken aspects of the liberal order while progressing alternative 
visions and pulling other actors into their spheres of influence. They constantly test 
the fundamental norms of the liberal order—such as sovereignty and freedom of 
navigation—and use their militaries to intimidate and coerce other actors to 
acquiesce their ambitions. These patterns can be traced back to various declarations 
and speeches that provide indications of their attitudes (e.g., President of Russia 
Office 2018; Xi Jinping 2017). In essence, the leaders of Russia and China present 
vaguely defined alternatives to the liberal order and its institutions that befit their 
long-term interests in the context of global power competition with Western 
hegemony. 
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Additionally, the level of cooperation and engagement between these powers is 
increasing despite a divergence of national interests and a growing power 
asymmetry in favour of China. The increase in cooperation is mainly a tool to 
counter Western influence locally, regionally, and internationally. A recent report by 
the US Director of National intelligence mentions that Moscow and Beijing “are more 
aligned than at any point since the mid-1950s, and the relationship is likely to 
strengthen” (Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2019: 24; Rolland 2019). 
Activities in Eurasia serve as a useful example of this growing cooperation. Both 
countries have their core interests in the region and compete for primacy and the 
advancement of economically significant regional projects2, and yet, Rolland notes 
that they have “demonstrated a remarkable consistency in trying to avoid 
competition and to develop instead a cooperative framework that allows for an 
alignment of their respective Eurasian initiatives” (2019: 10). The leaders of both 
countries have reiterated their pledge to strengthen economic integration, safeguard 
stability in Eurasia, advance principles of sovereign equality and non-interference in 
internal affairs, and consider how their flagship projects could mutually 
complement and strengthen the both Russia and China (Lewis 2018). 
The most relevant aspects of cooperation are in the international organizations and 
military sphere. Beijing and Moscow aim at weakening US unilateralism and 
interventionism as well as the Western conception of human rights and democracy. 
They cooperate in international organizations such as the UN by emphasizing 
sovereignty narratives that serve their narrow national interests (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Russian Federation 2016). 
Additionally, Russia and China have increased their strategic military exercises such 
as the latest VOSTOK 2018. Politically, the goal of this exercise was to “present a 
common front to their perceived potential adversary, the United States” (Johnson 
2018). VOSTOK 2018 is also militarily significant. Neither NATO-Russia nor China-
Russia operational cooperation have ever approached this scale. When reviewing the 
regularity and scale of shared exercises, it seems that Russia and China are working 
to build “multidimensional military and military-industrial cooperation” (Johnson 
2018). In sum, geopolitical tensions and Great Power rivalries have grown markedly 
over the past several years, generating structural risk of both limited and more 
general conflict (Cooley and Nexon 2020).  
                                               
2
  Examples of this include Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Putin’s 2016 suggestion of the 
“Greater Eurasian Partnership”, and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and participation in the Silk 
Road Economic Belt (SREB). 
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2. UNCONVENTIONAL SECURITY RISKS 
Security risks of an unconventional nature caused by disruptive technologies are 
likely to worsen in the coming years as an increasing number of actors will enhance 
their technological capabilities. Information technology and increased global 
interconnectivity will provide greater access to expertise in the form of information 
and skills. Open, restricted, legal, or illegal knowledge that was once available only to 
a handful of states will become attainable by non-state and independent actors. 
Furthermore, access to better computing, storage, and sensing capabilities is 
expected to increase as well, serving as a power multiplier for weaker actors. 
Instances representing this trend have already taken place in recent years. In some 
cases, actors have used seemingly benign devices to disrupt or neutralize the activity 
of critical infrastructures. In others, novel technologies were employed to surprise 
even well-prepared actors. In tandem with technological developments, new 
conceptions, doctrines, capabilities, and tools will be developed to compliment 
disruptive capabilities and to be employed in a manner that will require equally 
novel solutions (Rees 2018: 11-15, 83-88). 
2.1 Cyber-Warfare 
Unlike conventional and unconventional weapons, whose consequences are known 
and often horrifying enough to prevent their use, the lawless and normless nature of 
cyber weapons make the risk of conflict more likely. The limited number of case 
studies and the secrecy that shrouds the use of advanced cyber-weapons make it 
harder to assess their efficiency, true value, and risk. Nonetheless, the use of such 
weapons is expected to increase in the next five to ten years. Countries invest heavily 
in offensive capabilities as a means of defence through pre-emptive attacks, buthe 
vague nature of these capabilities complicates traditional calculations and present 
new challenges to security (Valeriano and Jensen 2019: 3–5). A report by the US Cyber 
Command illustrates the difficulty of effective and accountable use of cyber-
weapons. The idea of effectively deterring adversaries in a domain that is ruled by 
anonymity, countless actors, and no distinct borders is far-fetched and risky and 
furthers the militarization of cyberspace: 
We have learned we must stop attacks before they penetrate our cyber 
defenses or impair our military forces; and through persistent, integrated 
operations, we can influence adversary behavior and introduce uncertainty 
into their calculations. […] Through persistent action and competing more 
effectively below the level of armed conflict, we can influence the 
calculations of our adversaries, deter aggression, and clarify the distinction 
between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour in cyberspace. (US Cyber 
Command 2018: 2–7). 
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Though the number of countries capable of causing critical damage with cascading 
effects is still small,3 the first and most-relevant risk remains state and state-
sponsored cyber-attacks. States can dedicate significant resources for perpetuating 
such attacks, and the most severe risk is that a highly capable country will target a 
weaker but technological-dependent one. Past cyber-attacks on Estonia, Georgia, 
Ukraine, and North Korea serve as powerful templates for the future. In addition, a 
paralysation of critical infrastructure and a series of explosions and fires in key 
infrastructure facilities in Iran is another recent example with a potentially larger 
physical signature. Moreover, a growing number of countries, such as Iran and North 
Korea, is trying to join the club and is already experimenting with such weapons 
(Breene 2016; Detsch et al. 2020; Steiger et al. 2018). These risks could culminate into a 
cyber war. Theoretically speaking, this would be a war in which attacks from the 
cyberspace would achieve effects of strategic importance, rather than just temporary 
tactical advantages. Researchers are divided on whether it is even possible, and—
assuming that it is—whether a cyber war would be a clean affair without any large-
scale, physical fighting, or whether it is likely to supplement, and possibly 
exacerbate, open warfare (Geers 2015). 
The Russian cyber activities in the ongoing conflict with Ukraine are a part of cyber 
warfare but do not amount to a cyber war. Russia was able to harness its cyber 
capabilities in the conflict to achieve operational and strategic goals to previously 
unseen levels. Though not a full-fledged cyber war, the conflict entailed cyber 
skirmishes that could be reproduced with a higher intensity in a cyber war with 
potentially more destructive results. For example, Moscow used a variety of cyber 
weapons in combination with methods of intelligence collection and kinetic military 
operations by special and conventional forces. Such disciplined use of cyber-attacks 
is expected to feature more prominently in future conflicts (Giles 2015: 23–25; Wirtz 
2015: 36–37). 
Technological advancement enables growth and socioeconomic opportunities, but it 
also increases dependency. Modernized economies, governments, and militaries are 
becoming more dependent on information technology. This creates significant 
vulnerabilities to attacks from cyberspace. This trend is accelerating as the internet 
expands to other items and systems in various fields such as power grids, air and 
ground traffic control, satellites, banking, medical services industrial plants, and 
consumer products. Technology permeates every aspect of people’s lives via their 
smartphones, affecting everything from consumer habits to sources of information 
                                               
3
  Such countries include the United States, China, Russia, Israel and the United Kingdom. See Breene 
(2016). 
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(US Joint Chiefs of Staff 2018b: i2-i4). 
The promise in cyberspace for attackers is that they can inflict damage on many 
sectors and with various degrees of severity—from minor inconveniences such as 
ransomware, events of medium severity through disinformation operations, and 
catastrophic results such as interrupting the supply of electricity. Attackers can do all 
of the above while enjoying relatively high safety. The problem for those who wish to 
defend themselves is that establishing deterrence in cyberspace is hard. The logic of 
retribution plays a minor role, due to the difficulty in identifying the attacker or the 
actor that controls the attacker. Furthermore, cyberspace cuts across physical and 
sovereign boundaries, and its nature facilitates anonymity and enables deception. 
Soon, the risk of violent conflict escalation due to cyber-attacks will increase as well. 
Capabilities will become more lethal and accurate, and accountability will remain 
elusive at best. Norms in the cyber-domain remain woefully underdeveloped and 
contested, and the issue of infringing state sovereignty remains open to flexible 
interpretation (Lotrionte 2018). To what extent can and should states exercise 
sovereignty in cyberspace? In theoretical discussions, some argue that, despite being 
nonphysical, the potential for physical damage means that cyber-attacks can 
constitute a casus belli or just cause for military action and war. This consequence-
based approach increases the risk of violent conflict, however, since accidents and 
misunderstandings in cyberspace can also cause physical damage (Smith 2018). 
2.2 Grey-Zone-Warfare 
Introducing innovative capabilities and tools can presents security and even social 
risks. These risks are exacerbated when these capabilities are used as part of a 
structured doctrine to achieve a larger effect during a confrontation. Leading 
military powers are developing and experimenting with grey-zone/hybrid Warfare, 
which could destabilize regions with higher sensitivities or ongoing low-intensity 
conflicts. Both grey-zone and hybrid warfare represent a holistic approach to conflict 
that is distinguishable from better-known uses of military force. Their holistic 
characteristics combine kinetic and non-kinetic activities against military and civil 
targets, and psychological operation campaigns are aimed at civilian populations 
and political echelons using a wide variety of mediums. The underlying goal is to 
weaken the motivation for escalation on the part of the adversary (Freedman 2017). 
Grey-zone and hybrid warfare are similar but not identical. They are alike in the 
sense that both are intended to circumvent the adversary’s ability or will to engage in 
confrontation. The main difference is that grey-zone warfare is meant to be used 
below the threshold of war, thus blurring the boundaries between peacetime and 
military conflict and complicating the decision-making process and leaving more 
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room for miscalculations. Hybrid warfare takes the idea of combined warfare a step 
further, decompartmentalizing traditional combat arms and fusing them with 
political, irregular, and cyber warfare (Freedman 2017).4 
Blurring the distinction between peacetime and war using these doctrines increases 
the risk for (1) an escalation and unintended consequences caused by exchanges 
below the threshold that will heighten tension and bring about a larger-scale armed 
conflict, (2) miscalculated reactions caused by the difficulty to assess if the desired 
effect on the adversary’s perception is achieved, and (3) the unintended 
consequences caused by the enormous complexity that a transregional, multi-
domain, and multifunctional campaign entails (US Joint Chiefs of Staff 2018a: 31–32). 
The 2014 Russian campaign in Ukraine serves as a useful illustration. It was preceded 
by a speech by Valery Gerasimov, the chief of Russia’s general staff, describing what 
a hybrid military campaign might look like: 
“In the future”, he says, “wars will start without declarations. Countries that 
are otherwise stable and well-off could experience the most intense armed 
conflict in a timespan of a few days to few months. Military and non-military 
means will be used to achieve strategic ends. Among the non-military means, 
he mentioned political, economic, information and humanitarian efforts. 
Between the military and non-military one finds the use of covert force to 
enable deniability, manipulation of the local population and their support, 
using them as a fifth column or as a cover for concealed military forces.” 
(Freedman 2017: 223–24). 
The centrality and even the existence of a Gerasimov doctrine is a point of 
contestation among scholars. In practice, it does not matter. It is more important to 
understand what such warfare entails. The methods in use have been developed 
through many campaigns: the war with Georgia, the campaign and later annexation 
of parts of Ukraine, the intervention in Syria and Libya, and the cultivation of a 
frozen conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. These campaigns have included the 
use of militias, the grooming separatists and guerrilla movements, the application of 
propaganda and regional and global agitation, cyber warfare, the utilization of 
migration, and the weaponization of energy supplies (Kilcullen 2020). 
Similar to the Russian case, the US military is working on its doctrine: A recent report 
                                               
4
  There are multiple terms in use today to describe this novel doctrine such as “asymmetric warfare”, 
“new-generation warfare”, “non-linear warfare”, “liminal warfare”, and others. The plurality of terms is 
not without justification, as each focuses on a different aspect of the same new and incompletely 
understood phenomena. 
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by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (2018a) labelled such warfare as Integrated 
Campaigning, defined as a “Joint Force and interorganizational partner efforts” set to 
“enable the achievement and maintenance of policy by integrating military activities 
and aligning non-military activities” (6). This effort will take place within a 
calculated scope and scale, performed simultaneously and across multiple domains. 
The similarities to Gerasimov are not coincidental. The authors of the report in the 
Department of Defense (DoD) recognise the challenge of emerging and resurging 
global powers, and their hegemonic aspirations. They expect these powers to follow 
the lines of Gerasimov’s vision, but to specifically do so below the threshold that 
invoke a traditional military response from the US, thus not allowing it to utilise its 
superiority (v). 
The report encapsulates this concept with the term competition continuum. It enables 
us to grasp the complexity of such a conflict, moving forward from the binary 
concept of peace and war. Three steps span over the continuum: 
 Armed conflict in which the use of violence is the primary mean to satisfy 
interests (varies in in intensity and range from limited warfare to major wars) 
 Competition below armed conflict when two or more actors work toward 
incompatible interests but try to avoid an escalation to armed conflict 
 Cooperation, which includes the mutually beneficial relationships between 
actors with compatible interests (See Figure 2 below) 
Figure 2: Competition continuum 
 
Source: US Joint Chiefs of Staff (2018a: 8) 
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Grey-zone warfare poses a significant global risk for an increase in violent conflicts 
as well as in the eastern and southern periphery of the EU. Creating more room to 
manoeuvre under the threshold of war could tip the fragile balance of action and 
response using military force. Actors could dare to conduct bolder action under the 
threshold if they expect the other side to respond lightly or not at all, which increases 
the chance for miscalculation. In the case of a full-fledged conflict, hybrid warfare 
will include higher levels of disruption and destruction to civilian populations, 
infrastructure, and social fabric. The integrated nature of the doctrine targets not 
only the military and government but many aspects of civilian life and 
infrastructure to collapse the adversary’s will to retaliate. Unlike the traditional 
dynamics of escalation, hybrid warfare’s escalation is sharp. A country could find 
itself attacked—or believing it is attacked—in multiple military and civilian 
domains. Thus, the risk of unintended escalation and miscalculation increases 
immensely. 
2.3 Biological Weapons and Synthetic Biology 
Significant scientific advances have enabled the engineering of existing organisms 
and the creation of new ones that do not exist in nature—a process known as 
synthetic biology. Notwithstanding the great promise of preventing diseases, 
improving food productions, and dealing with pollution, there is an inherent risk to 
international security. The progress of synthetic biology in the coming years will 
expand the possibility of creating new weapons, increase the risk of mistakes, and 
broaden the range of actors that could use such processes in malicious ways. The 
highest risk originates in the fast-paced advancements in synthetic biology 
comparing to the slower development and implementation of biosecurity and 
biosafety practice (Trump et al. 2020). 
A study group of the National Academy of Sciences has recently published a study 
that was commissioned by the US Department of Defence to explore potentially 
harmful uses of emerging technologies (National Academies of Sciences, 
Engineering, and Medicine 2018). The group’s findings are troubling. Not only are 
significant risks expected to arise in the coming years, but the ease of using 
synthetic biology also makes them available to a growing array of actors, from 
individuals to states. The list below describes those risks that the group categorized 
as the highest relative risks that require immediate attention. Even the most 
immediate risks are not without barriers, but those barriers are very much 
dependent on either the resources available to the malicious party or time (i.e., the 
time needed for the technology to mature). 
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 The recreation of known pathogenic viruses. Synthetic biology technology would 
make it easier to revive diseases and synthesize them to be more deadly through 
increased virulence, resistance to antibiotics, and the ability to produce toxins 
and evade known treatment modalities (37–41). 
 “The making existing bacteria more dangerous: Creating a modified version of a 
known bacterium in which one or more traits have been altered to make the 
bacterium more dangerous” (32). 
 The creation of new harmful biochemicals: engineering an organism, such as a 
microorganism that can survive in the human gut, to produce a desired 
biochemical and delivering this microorganism in such a way that it can produce 
and release this product in situ (32). 
 Making existing viruses more dangerous: “Creating a modified version of a 
known virus in which one or more traits have been altered to make the virus 
more dangerous (such as by enhancing its virulence)” (31). 
 Manufacturing chemicals or biochemicals by exploiting natural metabolic 
pathways: producing naturally occurring toxins by engineering an organism to 
contain the pathway for the desired product (32). 
The potential harm of these new technologies is assessed according to the following 
criteria, and risks are then rated according to their calculated concern (in layman 
terms: probability and severity relative to each other). These include: (1) the usability 
of the technology including the ease of use, rate of development, barriers to use, and 
synergy with other technologies; (2) its usability as a weapon, including the ease of 
production and delivery, the scope of casualties expected, and the predictability of 
the expected malign results; (3) the requirements that actors need to fulfil, including 
access to expertise and resources and what size of the organizational footprint is 
required to use as a weapon; and (4) the mitigation potential when asked to defend 
against manifested risks (i.e., resilience). This category includes deterrence and other 
prevention capabilities, the ability to recognize an attack and attribute it to an actor, 
and capabilities to manage the consequences of an attack (National Academies of 
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2018: 24–31). 
As noted above, the main barriers to misuse of synthetic biology are the availability 
of technology and time to accumulate knowledge. These may hamper only 
independent and non-state actors from advancing in the field. State actors, however, 
could overcome them relatively easily, as the lack of oversight and control remains a 
serious issue. The access to gene drives, editing, and synthesis is increasingly 
conferred with limited or no oversight by industrial actors and national and 
international organizations (as seen in Figure 3 below) (Trump et al. 2020).  
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Figure 3: Increasing number of global users able to access genetic 
engineering (blue) and synthetic biology (orange) technologies over time 
 
Source: Trump et al. (2020: 3) 
3 ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS 
3.1 Disease Outbreaks 
Public health emergencies constitute a risk when triggered by a bio-terrorist attack 
or, alternatively, by secondary biological, chemical, or radiological contamination 
ensuing a cyber or kinetic terrorist attack on critical national infrastructures such as 
a water sanitising plant or an industrial chemical plant (Banks et al. 2019). Even the 
outbreak of a man-made disease poses significant risks to political stability, as 
security and military forces deployed abroad can be incapacitated, and the potential 
for transnational contamination can be presented. 
When our original risk survey report was compiled,5 the role of health—epidemics 
and pandemics—in triggering conflict and governance breakdown was only vaguely 
imaginable and understood (Nel and Righarts 2008). Today, a year into the COVID-19 
pandemic, a conflict and governance breakdown due to a pandemic seems more 
probable, though perhaps only slightly better understood. The inability of the 
                                               
5
  Magen et al. 2019. See note 1, supra.  
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governing forces to contain the spread of the disease can precipitate the region into 
chaos and even conflict. Halting international trade and the contamination of 
livestock can aggravate the situation by affecting people’s livelihoods. Such 
devastating scenarios could originate in Africa, parts of the Middle East, and other 
areas prone to the outbreak of infectious diseases. As with COVID-19, their effects will 
be felt much beyond the borders of the initially affected state(s) or region (Bruckner 
and Checchi 2011). 
Health crises may not affect intrastate and inter-state conflicts in the same way. 
Some scholars argue that they affect intrastate conflicts in a direct way and civil wars 
in an indirect way (via their negative effects on national wealth). This is caused, 
primarily, by the emergence of xenophobic and ethnocentric cultural norms in the 
wake of widespread infectious diseases (Letendre et al. 2010). 
Figure 4: Epidemic disease and military conflict 
 
Source: Peterson (2002) 
Other scholars identify three scenarios in which infectious diseases may provoke 
war: by influencing the relative balance of power among adversaries, generating 
disputes between nations over appropriate health and human rights policies, and 
engendering domestic instability (Peterson 2002) (see Figure 4 above). The latter 
raises particular concern, “by causing severe economic, political, and social effects, 
epidemic disease can produce domestic instability, civil war, or civil-military 
conflict, or it may lead a state to lash out against another state” (Peterson 2002: 57). In 
sub-Saharan Africa, for example, AIDS and the death of the main bread-winners has 
caused sudden income declines where “health care and burial costs mount, savings 
are depleted, surviving children leave school to work or care for sick relatives, food 
consumption drops, malnutrition and poverty worsen, and medical expenditures 
soar” (Peterson 2002: 58). Other infectious diseases may have similarly devastating 
consequences on ALS. 
The spread of Ebola and the loss of over 10,000 lives have underscored yet another 
level of relationship between political instability and health-related risks. In 
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Northern Congo, Ebola is spreading because medical personnel cannot access zones 
of conflict and tend to the sick. Similar difficulties could arise where the capacity of 
the health services is stretched thin by a conflict, and hospitals cannot attend to those 
stricken by the disease (Larson 2019). 
Finally, even in the absence of conflict, pandemics such as COVID-19 or smallpox can 
create world-wide chaos and destabilize fragile political entities. Even though 
smallpox was declared eradicated following a worldwide campaign of vaccination, 
the effectiveness of the smallpox vaccines has faded, raising concerns about 
vulnerability to a new outbreak.6 As seen with COVID-19, a novel virus might have no 
proven medical treatment, and the development of vaccinations is a long and 
difficult progress. Once developed, barriers in production and supply could still 
hamper efficient administration and even exacerbate tensions if it becomes an issue 
of international or internal politics. For example, in the event of an outbreak of 
smallpox, vaccines must be administered within hours, as the death toll rises sharply 
following the initial contamination. Stockpiles of vaccines may run out, even with 
the help of the US, the UN, and other EU member states. Preparing and responding to 
an outbreak of smallpox includes knowing where vaccines are and in what quantities 
and establishing priorities in administering them. In and around Europe, enhancing 
preparedness to health disasters also means contending with antibiotic resistance, 
which could make it more difficult to contain a spill-over of a health outbreak. In 
terms of global health vulnerability, antimicrobial resistance—the ability of 
microorganisms to resist antimicrobial treatments, especially antibiotics—is 
perceived as a high-security priority in many parts of the developed world. The EU 
takes it very seriously, investing 1.5 billion euros a year on antimicrobial resistance 
(Builder 2014; European Commission 2019). 
In the realm of health disasters as with other global and diffuse risks, resilience has 
the potential to prevent risks from materializing into threats. Educating the public 
and law enforcement officials, enhancing cooperation with medical services in 
neighbouring states, and developing procedures for triage and vaccine distribution 
can help societies withstand the pressure of a disease outbreak. 
                                               
6
  In 1999, the John Hopkins Center for Civilian Defence Studies ran a scenario on the spread of 
smallpox, and the results were apocalyptic (Garrett 2001: 79). In particular, they envisaged that, in 
one US city, the National Guard enforced martial law over the city’s two million residents. This is also 
the outcome envisaged in the movie Outbreak, where the US Army declares martial law to limit the 
spread of a form of the Ebola virus (85).  
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3.2 Uncontrolled Urbanization 
Urbanization, simply defined as a radical shift from a rural to an urban society, is an 
essential corollary of industrialization that goes hand in hand with the role of 
human settlements as engines of growth in the economy and as promoters of 
scientific, socio-cultural and technological development (Nsiah-Gyabaah 2003). As 
with many other risks analysed in this report, urbanization may remain a risk and 
never materialize as a threat. However, uncontrolled urbanization constitutes a risk 
in the sense that it may tilt exiting ALS into lawlessness, the breakdown of law and 
order, or outright civil conflict. 
Indeed, rapid or uncontrolled urbanization presents a significant risk to political 
stability by threatening livelihoods, health, security, and the environment. Rapid 
urbanization generally involves a surge in population growth, the concentration of 
people in urban areas, and/or the conversion of agricultural land into industrial 
zones (Cockayne et al. 2017). This process has been witnessed in many African cities, 
such as Lagos in Nigeria, or Abidjan in Cote d’Ivoire. In Africa, the annual growth rate 
of cities is 1.6% compared to 0.8% in developed countries, and the trend is unlikely to 
subside. Similarly, politically fragile states like Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan 
are all expected to more than double their urban population in less than 30 years 
(Afghanistan’s will almost triple from 8 to 22 million) (Sampaio 2018). Looking at 
worldwide trends, the figures tell a similar story: whereas roughly 34 percent of the 
world’s population lived in urban areas in 1961, by 2030 the figure will rise to over 60 
percent (cities and towns will become home to more than 1.4 billion additional 
people). Nearly all of this growth and movement will take place within the 
developing world, much of it in ALS (USAID 2017). 
The potential of rapid urbanization for destabilization and dislocation cannot be 
underestimated, particularly when such process takes place in ALS and CO. Rapid 
urbanization puts pressure on the delivery of goods and services (Saghir and Santoro 
2018). In areas that suffer from higher vulnerabilities, such as Sub-Saharan African, 
these risks can, in turn, increase the likelihood of endemic disease, vulnerability to 
climate events, gang violence, and radicalization. The combination of high 
population density, poverty, and lack of planning and infrastructure can also turn 
rapid urbanization towards a tipping point. 
3.3 Environmental Risks 
The likelihood of natural catastrophic events happening within a short to medium 
time frame (three to seven years) is relatively low. For this reason, this report focuses 
on natural disasters, which, unlike catastrophic events, strike every year with 
increasing frequency and intensity, often affecting more than one state at a time. 
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Floods, for example, stand out as a major cause of human and financial destruction 
and loss. Fifty people died in the 2014 floods in the Balkans, and it is estimated that 
flooding rivers will affect about 300,000 people per year in the EU by the 2050s, and 
390,000 people by the 2080s. The British Isles, Western Europe, and northern Italy 
are among the most vulnerable regions (European Environment Agency 2016). Under 
a high emissions scenario (assuming an 88 cm sea-level rise), the number of deaths 
in the EU due to coastal flooding in the 2080s would increase by 3,000, with two-
thirds of these deaths in Western Europe. Coastal adaptation measures (e.g., dikes 
and beach nourishment) can significantly reduce those risks, demonstrating the 
impact of preparedness and prevention (European Environment Agency 2016). 
However, they, too, require significant investments. 
For all these reasons, the cycle beginning with the prevention of natural disasters 
and leading to enhanced disaster management and recovery has become a national 
security priority. Alongside international and domestic terrorism, cyber, and 
military confrontation, the UK lists natural disasters, including severe coastal 
flooding, among the highest security priorities (HM Government 2010). 
Similarly, the US has placed “all types of severe weather, which have the potential to 
pose a significant threat to human health and safety, property, critical infrastructure, 
and homeland security” under the umbrella of the Department of Homeland Security 
(US Department of Homeland Security 2018). In the US, climate change has been 
recognized as “an urgent and growing threat to our national security contributing to 
increased natural disasters, refugee flows, and conflicts over basic resources like 
food and water” (White House 2015: 12). This echoes the EU’s Global Strategy, which 
states that “hybrid threats, economic volatility, climate change and energy insecurity 
endanger our people and territory” (European Union External Action 2016). 
Forecasting disaster is merely the first step in identifying the tipping point at which 
a disaster might trigger events leading to governance breakdown or violent conflict 
in ALS and CO. Moving to the second step of the analysis requires an exploration of 
the nexus between natural disasters and political instability in general, and in ALS 
and CO in particular. The field has grown in recent years but remains fragmented 
(Salehyan 2014). Alongside predictions that a 2 °C rise in temperatures is estimated to 
substantially increase the risk of armed conflict by 13%, researchers remain 
uncertain as to how climatic changes interact with and/or are conditioned by 
socioeconomic, political, and demographic settings (Koubi 2019; Mach et al. 2019). 
Research in how these factors interact is still in embryonic stages, but the seeds for 
understanding the nexus between climate exposure on one hand and state fragility 
on the other have been firmly planted (Cramer et al. 2018; Moon 2007). More light 
will be shed on the likelihood and impact of climate disasters as insurance 
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companies and entire sectors (such as the hotel industry) reassess preparedness and 
policies in the face of climate risk. 
For our purposes, what matters is that “climate change adds an additional layer of 
stress that can increase state fragility and likelihood of conflict” (McLeman 2017: 105), 
with our research focusing on the tipping point at which the political and climate 
vulnerabilities coincide. In other words, in what circumstances does climate change 
weaken state capacity and legitimacy, “creating opportunities for the disgruntled to 
engage in violent resistance”, thereby increasing the risk of war or the breakdown of 
the state? (Nel and Righarts 2008: 162) We have identified the following factors as 
contributing to such circumstances: economic factors, competition over river water, 
regime type, chronic internal conflict, prior exposure to disaster, population growth, 
population movement, rapid onset geological disasters, and political fragility. 
Although it may seem tautological to include chronic internal conflict and political 
fragility, the analysis below elaborates on their relevance. 
The causal link between environmental scarcity and conflict on one hand, and the 
weakening of states, on the other, was already spelled out in the 1980s and 1990s—a 
time where the notion of security expanded in both theory and practice (Buzan 1983; 
UNDP 1994). At the time, economic factors already featured prominently. Poor 
societies were identified as the most vulnerable in light of their inability to sustain 
environmental scarcity “and the social crises they cause” (Homer-Dixon 1994: 6). In 
these and later studies, infant mortality was often used as the relevant variable to 
account for income (in)equality (Nel and Righarts 2008). In addition, disasters can 
damage an already fragile water and food infrastructure, generating heightened 
competition over resources and overwhelming the capacity of societal institutions. 
Environmental and political factors, as well as prior exposure to conflict, are also 
likely to precipitate a tipping point, potentially turning environmental risks into 
threats in ALS and CO (Nardulli et al. 2015). 
The competition over river water has been singled out as a factor triggering war, 
particularly civil war. Generally speaking, the “insidious and cumulative social 
impacts” of resource scarcity, which include “population movement, economic 
decline, and the weakening of states”, can contribute to “diffuse and persistent sub-
national violence” (Homer-Dixon 1994: 36). More specifically, access to river water 
(situations in which riparian groups do not enter into either a formal or informal 
agreement regarding their use of the water and how it impacts other groups located 
along the river banks) can greatly heighten tensions within and between states. 
Turkey and Iran’s use of the water from the Euphrates regularly angers Iraq, just like 
Ethiopia’s use of the Nile’s water has angered Egypt (Daniel and Michael 2018). 
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Research shows that mixed regimes increase the risk of violent civil conflict in the 
wake of natural disasters (Nel and Righarts 2008). Autocracies or consolidated 
democracies seem less prone to descend into conflict or governance breakdown in 
such circumstances. This is because grievances will be repressed in autocracies, and 
consolidated democracies “provide legitimate channels for voicing dissent, and 
incentives to engage in violence are less than in a partial, incomplete democracy” 
(Nel and Righarts 2008). 
For “countries experiencing chronic internal conflict because of environmental 
stress”, the outcome of environmental disasters will be fragmentation or the decline 
into authoritarianism (Homer-Dixon 1994: 40). Such regimes ‘“may be inclined to 
launch attacks against other countries to divert popular attention from internal 
stresses. Any of these outcomes could seriously disrupt international security” 
(Homer-Dixon 1994: 40). Societies prone to conflict will likely experience major 
conflicts, defined as leading to more than 1,000 deaths, in the wake of natural 
disasters (Hauge and Ellingsen 1998). Prior exposure to conflict, therefore, increases 
the risk of reaching a tipping point following extreme environmental events. 
Interestingly, prior exposure to natural disaster(s) also increases such risk: a state 
that experiences at least one natural disaster is 30% more likely to experience violent 
civil conflict than a state that has experienced none (Nel and Righarts 2008). 
Demographics will also affect the impact of a natural disaster. Population growth 
puts more people in harm’s way and has been recognized as an important driver 
(UNISDR 2015: 14). Population movement must also be taken into consideration when 
predicting whether climate change will lead to violent conflict (most likely at the 
national level) (Brzoska and Fröhlich 2016). 
The diagram below (Figure 5) summarizes the chain of events leading from climate 
change to violent conflict, with migration (analysed in section 6 below) acting as an 
important vector of conflict. 
Additional determinants related to the disaster itself also play a role. Rapid-onset 
disasters, such as storms and floods, pose a more significant risk of violent civil 
conflict than slow-onset disasters (Figure 6 below). Within this category of disaster, 
geological disasters, such as earthquakes and volcano eruptions, pose a greater risk 
than climate-related disasters. 
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Figure 5: From climate change to violent conflict 
 
Source: Brzoska and Fröhlich 2016 
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Figure 6: Summary of causal argument linking natural disasters and 
violent civil conflict 
 
Source: Nel and Righarts (2008) 
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The most important factor of environmental risk is limited statehood itself, or, as 
noted in a USAID Report, state effectiveness (the capacity of public-sector 
institutions and practices) and legitimacy (the degree of direct or indirect public 
support for government arrangements, officials, and practices) assessed in the 
political, security, economic, and social spheres. The report explores the intersection 
of what it terms as fragility and climate risks and identifies areas vulnerable to both 
climate change events and political instability (see Figure 7 below).  
Figure 7: Where climate exposure and fragility risks overlap 
  
Source: USAID (2018) 
It concludes that states with more than 1 million people living in high exposure areas 
are mostly located in sub-Saharan Africa, followed by the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) and South and Southeast Asia. Most interestingly, the USAID analysis 
points to Egypt as among the most vulnerable state, with 33 million people (or 39% of 
its population) and 13.7 million people (or 16% of its population) facing high risk and 
very high risk of climate exposure, respectively:7 
                                               
7
  Like Egypt, Cambodia and Burma not only have a large number of people in very high exposure 
areas, but they also have a large percentage of the population living in these areas: Cambodia with 
20 percent, Egypt with 16 percent, and Burma with 15 percent. In India, 44 million people live in very 
high exposure areas.  
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Populations in high exposure areas often face not just a single type of climate 
stressor but several overlapping climate stressors in that location—from 
riverine flooding and coastal inundation to droughts and wildfires. This can 
heighten overall vulnerability and can also place repeated stress on a range of 
institutions and social and economic systems. (USAID 2018: 21) 
Other researchers have similarly identified areas most vulnerable to rising sea levels 
as predominantly located in the southern and eastern Mediterranean region. There, 
“social and political instability contribute to climate vulnerability, particularly for 
impoverished population groups and for states in which the political and social 
context sets strong limits for efforts to adapt to climate change and mitigate its local 
impacts” (Cramer et al. 2018: 977). Twelve of the 20 highest-ranked countries in the 
Fragile States Index are located in the Middle East, “where climate change is expected 
to create heightened levels of water scarcity, and three—Afghanistan, Somalia, and 
Syria—currently account for more than half of the world’s current refugee 
population” (McLeman 2017). 
The United States’ National Intelligence Council’s research (2016: 13) points to the fact 
that, within less than five years, “regions with weak governance, poor living 
conditions, or persistent conflict that limit the capacity of governments and societies 
to cope with additional stress” will be most vulnerable to climate-related security 
risks. 
In sum, it would be inaccurate to conclude that every natural disaster will give rise to 
conflict and create a tipping point for ALS and CO. However, a tipping point could 
materialize in the short and medium-term (between one and three months after a 
disaster strikes). This would most likely be in the form of an internal conflict 
following a geological disaster (such as an earthquake or volcanic eruption) in a 
country with a low GDP and/or high infant mortality, and where a mixed political 
regime is in place. Competition over river water increases the risk of civil conflicts. 
Chronic conflict and prior exposure to disaster increase the likelihood of conflict, but 
research has also called for caution vis-à-vis areas that have not witnessed extreme 
events in the past, including in advanced industrial countries (US National 
Intelligence Council 2016). The intensity of the disaster seems less relevant to the 
outbreak of violence or governance breakdown. Finally, it should be noted that 
researchers suspect that further and presently under-researched determinants might 
play a role in worsening the impact of natural disasters, such as horizontal inequality 
between societal groups, ecological fragility, the quality and robustness of local and 
national authorities to deal with the type of systemic shocks posed by natural 
disasters, and the level of organization of the discontent group(s) initiating violence 
and transforming discontents acts into contentious ones (Nardulli et al. 2015).  
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4. DEMOGRAPHY AND UNCONTROLLED MIGRATION 
The issue of uncontrolled migration, perhaps more than any other single public 
policy question, has dominated popular perceptions of risks among European 
citizens in the last several years. As recent Eurobarometer figures demonstrate, from 
relatively low salience in 2011-2012, alongside fears of terrorism (with which it is 
intermingled in multiple and complex ways), migration has risen to become the 
number one issue of concern for EU citizens, particularly following the onset of the 
migration crisis in 2014-2015. While over the past three years their urgency has 
somewhat diminished, migration remains the issue of highest public concern for EU 
citizens. Moreover, the searing experience of the 2015-2016 migration (or “refugee”) 
crisis and its political aftermath has left a difficult political and border-security 
legacy in the EU, a reality which demonstrates the high potential for this issue to 
have a deeply destabilizing effect on the EU governance system. Indeed, recent 
history has shown that even a relatively small influx of uncontrolled migration into 
the Schengen Area is likely to precipitate societal shockwaves with potentially 
highly-polarizing political consequences, even in times of unparalleled peace and 
relative economic affluence. Accordingly, in thinking about EU preparedness and 
adaptation, close attention will have to be given to the subject of uncontrolled 
migration, both directly and in terms of its interaction with other risks covered in 
this paper—notably those of terrorism, climate, and adverse regimes in regions 
neighbouring the EU. 
Figure 8: Migration tops EU citizen concerns 
 
Source: European Parliamentary Research Service (2019) 
For the purposes of this paper, demographic and migration-potential risks involve 
three main analytical issues that will be analysed in this section: large-scale 
demographic dynamics creating rising migratory pressures into the EU, current or 
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foreseeable concentrations of migrant populations in proximity to EU borders, and 
the combined risk of migration and terrorism. 
While actual migratory patterns are shaped by multiple interactive factors and 
broadly specific future migration scales, routes and geographic end-ports are 
difficult to predict with any accuracy (Leiken and Brooke 2006). However, emerging 
demographic realities in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East point to powerful 
migratory incentives from the latter two regions into Europe. Indeed, given current 
and projected global demographic trends, it is difficult to see large-scale migration 
from these regions into the EU not materializing over the course of the coming 
decades (without even including unforeseeable crises and catastrophes that 
stimulate migration). According to UN projections, the most striking global 
demographic development in the coming decades will be the dramatic rise in Africa’s 
and the decline in Europe’s respective populations. Between today and 2100, Africa’s 
population is expected to rise from 1.3 billion to between 3.5 and 4.5 billion people 
(from 17% to 40% of the world’s total population). Over the same period, Europe is 
projected to be the only region in the world where population is expected to fall in 
absolute terms. Today, its population stands at around 743 million; by 2100, this is 
projected to fall to 653 million (Bricker and Ibbitson 2019: 55-74). 
Figure 9: Global population projections 
 
Source: United Nations (2015) 
Nevertheless, these macro projections tell us little about expected migratory 
dynamics. The fact that China is far more densely populated than Siberia, for 
example, does not by itself generate substantial migratory pressures from the 
former to the latter. Still, these projected macro-demographic realities certainly 
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create the potential for large-scale migration from south to north. Moreover, 
potential migratory incentives in the Africa-Europe context are compounded by a 
panoply of additional potent factors. First, the expected growing imbalance in sheer 
population size is matched by a similar imbalance in fertility rates (World Bank 
2019). 
Second, growing demographic disparities are compounded by existing gaps in 
wealth and other predictors of human wellbeing, such as investment in education, 
infrastructure, and health. Lack of social and economic opportunity, coupled with 
growing poverty, crime, and population density could well drive many young and 
able-bodied workers to migrate to wealthier parts of the world. Geography, colonial-
era ties, and the presence of existing ethnic and religious communities all point to 
Europe as the most likely magnet for migration.  
Barring a stark change of course—where socio-economic opportunities and 
conditions improve in Africa and the Middle East, sharply decline in Europe, or 
both—these factors are expected to generate potent “pull” forces of migrants into 
Europe, particularly as below-replacement domestic fertility rates and ageing 
populations in Europe create a growing demand for a labour-age population import.  
Figure 10: GDP per capita EU & Africa 
 
Source: European Commission and Eurostat (2014) 
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South-north migratory pressures are expected to increase—potentially very 
significantly—under scenarios of increased fragility, violence, disease, and/or 
climate-induced adverse conditions. As discussed section 5 of this paper, parts of sub-
Saharan Africa, the Sahel, and the Middle East are relatively more vulnerable to a 
combination of such adverse natural or man-made conditions, which could 
compound south-north migratory pressures. Indeed, the overall picture that emerges 
from the analysis of the various relevant risk-factors suggests that a host of natural 
(e.g., disease or environmental) and socio-economic conditions (including regime 
characteristics, violence and rapid urbanization) may generate additional migratory 
“push” factors away from large parts of sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, and the 
Middle East towards Europe. One such indicator is what the USAID has recently 
described as the double burden of fragility and climate exposure (USAID 2018). 
Figure 11: Combined risk of fragility and climate exposure 
 
Source: USAID (2018) 
Summarizing the plethora of “push” factors from the Middle East, North Africa, 
Sahel, and parts of sub-Saharan Africa towards Europe, a recent report by the 
Denmark-based Mixed Migration Centre highlights some important aspects of 
migration from the MENA region into Europe (Mixed Migration Centre 2018). The 
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MENA region, in particular, has been going through a long period of instability, 
which shows little signs of abatement. In some cases, governments lack the 
capabilities to serve their citizens to such an extent that their citizens are willing to 
take high risks in their attempts to find a better future. In other cases, governments 
actively target their citizens with violence, making dislocation the only viable option. 
As urbanization accelerates in MENA and parts of sub-Saharan Africa, awareness of 
migration opportunities rises, as does the capacity for would-be migrants to 
mobilize. The overall migration profile in the region is also diverse, which increases 
the complexity of the problems. Migrants arrive from an assortment of countries 
from the Levant, North Africa, East Africa, and West Africa. These communities 
differentiate themselves from one another on many levels (including religion and 
ethnicity), which complicates long-term solution structures (Mixed Migration Centre 
2018). 
Indeed, the Mixed Migration Centre report suggests a number of dynamics are likely 
to increase population movements and exacerbate tensions around south-north 
migration by 2030. These include the prospect of upper and middle-class populations 
fleeing degenerating conditions; further population swaps and ethnic/sectarian 
violence in the MENA region (as the result of Turkish, Syrian, and Iranian reactions 
to Kurdish aspirations for greater autonomy or independence for example); rapid 
spurts of migration as the result of regime instability or collapse (in Algeria or Egypt 
for instance); and drought, earthquake, or disease-induced large-scale south-north 
migration. 
Lastly, European intelligence agencies and the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) have expressed concern that immigration flows represent 
considerable terrorism risks (IOM 2003; 2010). This has already led to the 
“securitization of migration” in most western countries, including the EU (Neal 
2009). Existing evidence on this risk reveals several important insights. For example, 
several studies have established that the likelihood of conflict spill over significantly 
increases with a larger refugee influx from nearby conflict-torn countries (Salehyan 
and Gleditsch 2006). Indeed, one study found that refugee influx is associated with 
the spread of terrorism across pars of states (dyads) (Milton et al. 2013). However, 
these findings pertain to areas characterized by spatial units with geographical 
contiguity, which is generally not the case in the EU. The latest available scholarship 
on the relationship between migration and terrorism points to a mixed picture of 
risk. Migrants stemming from terrorist-prone states moving to another country are 
an important vehicle for the diffusion of terrorism from one country to another. At 
the same time, migrant flows itself (i.e., when increased immigration is not linked to 
terrorism in the migrants’ countries of origin) is actually associated with lower levels 
of terrorist attacks (Bove and Böhmelt 2016). 
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5. GLOBAL FINANCIAL AND OTHER SYSTEMIC ECONOMIC RISKS 
The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 represented the greatest financial and 
economic upheaval since the Great Depression of the 1930s. It took the financial 
world by surprise, and its aftershocks—notably the Greek debt crisis—have been 
identified as major drivers of populist politics in Europe and have diminished trust 
in the EU’s ability to predict and mitigate systemic risks. Since 2008, economists, 
traders, and fund-managers have wearily watched for signs of financial and 
economic risks that could trigger the next crisis. The potentially destabilizing impact 
of such global financial downturns and their aggravating effect on ALS and CO 
equally call for caution on the part of the EU and its member states. 
Apart from lingering concerns about the possibility of some form of a repeat of the 
2008 financial crisis as the result of slacking financial-sector regulation, economists 
tasked with scanning for future systemic economic risks—such as the US Federal 
Reserve, the IMF, and OECD—identify three main areas of near to medium-term 
concern: (1) Brexit, Eurozone fiscal challenges, and wider sovereign debt that may 
negatively impact the EU, the US, China, and other major economies and lead to a 
global economic slowdown or full-blown recession; (2) trade tensions leading to a 
global economic slowdown or recession; and (3) corporate debt. 
5.1 Brexit, Euro-Area Fiscal Challenges and Sovereign Debt  
In a highly interconnected global financial system, vulnerabilities within the EU 
itself (or the EU plus the UK in a possible post-Brexit scenario) have the potential of 
posing risks to the financial system of other major economies, particularly that of 
the US, which maintains dense linkages with large European economies and, to a 
lesser extent, China (which is already experiencing substantial slowing in growth 
rates). As the US Federal Reserve recently warned, two scenarios pose substantial 
risks for the US financial system to the extent that, should one or both materialize, 
they could trigger a global economic slowdown or full-blown recession (Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2018). These fears are also at the heart of 
the IMF World Economic Outlook reports for 2019 and 2020 (IMF 2018, 2019b). 
Lingering uncertainties over future economic relations between the EU and UK carry 
the potential for significant disruption in trade and investment in the UK and Single 
Market. Under a scenario of no gradual withdrawal agreement in particular (i.e., “no-
deal”), there will be no orderly transition period and a wide range of economic and 
financial activities in the UK—the world’s fifth-largest economy—could be seriously 
disrupted. Indeed, the IMF World Economic Outlook update report published in 
January 2019 identifies a no-deal Brexit as one of the two biggest risks to the global 
economy in 2019 and 2020 (IMF 2019b). According to the US Federal Reserve, a Brexit-
induced disruption in the UK and EU economies could adversely impact the US 
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economy through several transmission channels, precipitating a slow-down or 
recession, which could then further exacerbate the downturn in the UK and EU. 
First, Brexit could lead to market volatility and a sharp pullback of consumer 
confidence and investors connected to UK and EU-related assets, as occurred during 
the June 2016 Brexit referendum and Greek debt crisis. Second, “spillover effects 
from the UK and other European banks could be transmitted to the US financial 
system directly through credit exposures as well as indirectly through the common 
participation of globally active banks in a broad range of activities and markets” 
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2018: 37). Third, a sharp economic 
downturn in the UK and EU—triggered or exacerbated by Brexit and likely 
accompanied by dollar appreciation—could harm US and Chinese trade at a time 
when China (the second-largest economy in the world) is already experiencing 
significant economic slowing, as mentioned above. Moreover, after years of rapid 
credit expansion, both Chinese lenders and borrowers are more exposed in the event 
of a slowdown. Under these conditions, developments that trigger a serious straining 
of Chinese companies and consumers to repay debt—such as an escalation of 
international trade tensions or a sharp drop in Chinese real estate prices—could 
have adverse effects on the Chinese and global economy. 
Under conditions where the US, EU (or EU plus UK), and Chinese economies all 
experience simultaneous economic downturns, the risks of a global economic 
recession would be substantially increased, threatening to trigger a sharp economic 
downturn (including sovereign fiscal crises) in some EU member states and in 
vulnerable economies neighbouring the EU. 
Figure 12: Latest growth projections (% change) 
 
Source: IMF (2019b) 
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Despite improvements since the 2010-2012 sovereign debt crisis, confidence in the 
euro area’s fiscal and financial stability remains fragile, and there are fears that a 
substantial downturn in the EU economy (as the result of Brexit or a wider global 
economic slowdown) could trigger a new debt crisis, most worryingly in the EU’s 
third-largest economy, Italy. 
According to the IMF, the burden of public debt is a growing problem across the 
globe. In advanced countries, public debt is at levels not seen since World War II (IMF 
2019a). Gross borrowings by governments from the bond markets are also set to 
reach a new record level in 2019, according to the recent OECD report (OECD 2019). 
Emerging-market public debt has accumulated to levels last seen during the 1980s 
debt crisis, and 40% of low-income countries—that is, 24 of 60 countries—are in or at 
high risk of debt distress, resulting in the inability to service public debt, which could 
produce significant disruption of economic activity and employment (Mühleisen 
and Flanagan 2019). 
Figure 13: National debt forecast of selected Euro countries 2018 to 2020 (in 
relation to GDP) 
 
Source: European Commission (n.d.) 
High debt levels are not a cause for concern as long as real interest rates are very low, 
as they are at present in many advanced economies. Yet high levels of debt make 
governments much more vulnerable to a tightening of global financial conditions 
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and higher interest costs. A debt crisis may be triggered when levels of debt are 
already high and a country is then hit by a sharp economic downturn (as the result of 
a regional or global recession), or in the wake of natural disasters or economic shocks 
that impair its ability to repay or otherwise service the debt. It is typically low-
income countries that face the most difficult debt challenges and are also usually the 
least well-equipped to respond. Countries characterized by a high debt-to-GDP ratio 
in the EU’s neighbourhood are notably Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, Mauritania, and 
Morocco. 
5.2 Trade Tensions 
At the time of writing, US-China negotiators appear to be close to reaching an 
agreement on a new bilateral trade deal, somewhat alleviating recent fears of rising 
trade and geostrategic tensions between the two largest economies in the world. That 
said, there are concerns that, even if a deal is reached, it would not eliminate the 
other sources of tension in the economic and strategic duel between Washington and 
Beijing—notably over the South China Sea and Taiwan—and that the 
implementation of any new trade deal (which is expected to include US-controlled 
enforcement mechanisms) could itself be a source of further tensions (Politi and 
Hornby 2019). 
The potential systemic economic risk of a new escalation in tariffs, and new 
accompanying stresses for global financial markets, can be glimpsed from the recent 
US-China trade tensions entailing the imposition of tariffs on imports from each of 
the respective countries between March and September 2018. As the IMF World 
Economic Outlook report documents, the global growth forecast for 2019 and 2020 
had already been revised downward (to 2018 levels) because of the negative effects of 
tariff increases enacted in the United States and China earlier that year. Looking 
forward, IMF Managing Director, Christine Lagarde, recently stated that the IMF has 
re-assessed its analysis of the US-China trade war’s effects, showing that if all trade 
between the world’s two largest economies were subjected to a 25% tariff (as US 
President Donald Trump has warned), US gross domestic product (GDP) would fall by 
up to 0.6%, while China’s would fall by up to 1.5% (Lagarde 2019). 
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Figure 14: Trade tensions 
 
 
Source: Baker et al. (n.d). 
5.3 Corporate Debt 
Both the US Federal Reserve and the OECD have recently focused on corporate debt 
(non-financial companies borrowing money) as a major growing risk to the global 
financial system (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2018; Çelik et al. 
2019). Global corporate debt (in the form of corporate bonds issued by non-financial 
companies) has ballooned over the past decade, reaching a record high of almost 13 
trillion USD at the end of 2018. This is double the outstanding amount in real terms 
before the 2008 financial crisis. Between 2008-2018, global corporate bond issuance 
averaged USD 1.7 trillion per year, compared to an annual average of USD 864 billion 
during the years leading up to the crisis. Companies from advanced economies, 
which hold 79% of the total global outstanding amount of corporate bonds as of 2018, 
have seen that volume grow by 70%, from USD 5.97 trillion in 2008 to USD 10.17 
trillion in 2018. The corporate bond market in emerging markets, mainly driven by 
growth in China, reached a total outstanding amount of USD 2.78 trillion in 2018, up 
395% compared to a decade ago. China has moved from a negligible level of issuance 
prior to the 2008 crisis to a record issuance amount of USD 590 billion in 2016, 
ranking second highest in the world (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System 2018; Çelik et al. 2019). 
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Figure 15: Total outstanding amount of corporate bonds issued by non-
financial companies 
 
Source: Çelik et al. (2019) 
The existing vulnerabilities in the corporate debt market are significantly different 
from that of the previous pre-crisis cycle, raising several causes for concern. While 
corporate debt in itself does not constitute a risk, the share of lowest quality 
investment-grade bonds (i.e., bad credit risk) stands at 54%, a historical high, and 
there has been a marked decrease in bondholder rights that could amplify negative 
effects in the event of market stress. 
At the same time, according to the OECD, over the next three years, companies will 
have to pay back or refinance about 4 trillion USD worth of corporate bonds. This is 
close to the total balance sheet of the US Federal Reserve. In the case of a financial 
shock similar to 2008, an additional USD 500 billion worth of corporate bonds would 
degenerate to the non-investment grade market within a year. In the case of a 
downturn in the US, Europe, or China, highly leveraged companies would face 
difficulties in servicing their debt, which, in turn, could amplify the effects of a 
downturn through lower investment and higher default rates. Indeed, in the event of 
cooling economic growth from US-China or US-EU trade tensions and a slower rate 
of expansion in China, the ability of firms to generate the income to repay the loans 
may be seriously compromised, turning economic slow-down into a full-blown 
recession in the US, EU, and possibly China (Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System 2018: 37–38). 
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In a world defined by unprecedented connectivity and complex interactions, actors 
seeking to anticipate governance breakdown or violent conflict and engage in more 
effective resilience-building require a fuller toolkit for risk analysis and prediction. 
This is particularly true in the EU’s neighbourhood, which includes several ALS 
vulnerable to global and diffuse risks. As an external governance actor in its 
neighbourhood, the EU must supplement risk analysis of vulnerable areas with 
resilience-building. Strengthening the ability of a community to withstand extreme 
weather can minimize the risk of mounting tensions with neighbouring groups and 
enable local leaders to continue providing basic services even in times of crisis. 
Resilience-building efforts can thus play a significant role in containing the impact 
of global and diffuse risks. A new EU strategy should also holistically analyse the 
impact of the various risks and vulnerabilities: any approach that looks at risks as 
hermetically sealed clusters is doomed to overlook a looming tipping point and 
undermine efforts at building resilience to individual risks.  
Beyond the immediate context of EU external relations, the main purpose of this 
Working Paper has been to highlight the need to identify and integrate global and 
diffuse risks into explanatory logics of violent conflict and governance breakdown. It 
is only by squarely facing this challenge that we can generate better predictive 
models, improve our capacity to forecast conflict and chaos, and develop resilience-
building strategies. In this context, our aim has been one of framing and illustration; 
our typology is deliberately suggestive and provocative, and the five risk clusters we 
delineate invite future engagement. The demand for such engagement is there and 
likely to grow in the coming decade. 
The typology draws on quantitative and qualitative approaches and integrates 
insights learned from the leading research in multiple branches of political 
science—political instability risk assessment, armed conflict prediction, and disaster 
forecasting—to ensure relevance and completeness. Ultimately, the identification 
and classification of diffuse risks seeks to assist the EU and its member states in 
preventing ALS from deteriorating into governance breakdown and violent conflict.  
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